The first systematic collaboration between cognitive scientists and sports psychologists considers the mind–body relationship from the perspective of athletic skill and sports practice. This landmark work is the first systematic collaboration between cognitive scientists and sports psychologists that considers the mind–body relationship from the perspective of athletic skill and sports practice. With twenty-six chapters by leading researchers, the book connects and integrates findings from fields that range from philosophy of mind to sociology of sports. The chapters show not only that (...) sports can tell scientists how the human mind works but also that the scientific study of the human mind can help athletes succeed. Sports psychology research has always focused on the themes, notions, and models of embodied cognition; embodied cognition, in turn, has found striking confirmation of its theoretical claims in the psychological accounts of sports performance and athletic skill. Athletic skill is a legitimate form of intelligence, involving cognitive faculties no less sophisticated and complex than those required by mathematical problem solving. After presenting the key concepts necessary for applying embodied cognition to sports psychology, the book discusses skill disruption ; sensorimotor skill acquisition and how training correlates to the development of cognitive faculties; the intersubjective and social dimension of sports skills, seen in team sports; sports practice in cultural and societal contexts; the notion of “affordance” and its significance for ecological psychology and embodied cognition theory; and the mind's predictive capabilities, which enable anticipation, creativity, improvisation, and imagination in sports performance. Contributors Ana Maria Abreu, Kenneth Aggerholm, Salvatore Maria Aglioti, Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza, Duarte Araújo, Jürgen Beckmann, Kath Bicknell, Geoffrey P. Bingham, Jens E. Birch, Gunnar Breivik, Noel E. Brick, Massimiliano L. Cappuccio, Thomas H. Carr, Alberto Cei, Anthony Chemero, Wayne Christensen, Lincoln J. Colling, Cassie Comley, Keith Davids, Matt Dicks, Caren Diehl, Karl Erickson, Anna Esposito, Pedro Tiago Esteves, Mirko Farina, Giolo Fele, Denis Francesconi, Shaun Gallagher, Gowrishankar Ganesh, Raúl Sánchez-García, Rob Gray, Denise M. Hill, Daniel D. Hutto, Tsuyoshi Ikegami, Geir Jordet, Adam Kiefer, Michael Kirchhoff, Kevin Krein, Kenneth Liberman, Tadhg E. MacIntyre, Nelson Mauro Maldonato, David L. Mann, Richard S. W. Masters, Patrick McGivern, Doris McIlwain, Michele Merritt, Christopher Mesagno, Vegard Fusche Moe, Barbara Gail Montero, Aidan P. Moran, David Moreau, Hiroki Nakamoto, Alberto Oliverio, David Papineau, Gert-Jan Pepping, Miriam Reiner, Ian Renshaw, Michael A. Riley, Zuzanna Rucinska, Lawrence Shapiro, Paula Silva, Shannon Spaulding, John Sutton, Phillip D. Tomporowski, John Toner, Andrew D. Wilson, Audrey Yap, Qin Zhu, Christopher Madan. (shrink)

Concept and theory formation in the social sciences, by A. Schutz.--Is it a science? by S. Morgenbesser.--Knowledge and interest, by J. Habermas.--Sociological explanation, by T. Burns.--Methodological individualism reconsidered, by S. Lukes.--The problem of rationality in the social world, by A. Schutz.--Concepts and society, by E. Gellner.--Symbols in Ndembu ritual, by V. Turner.--Telstar and the Aborigines or La pensée sauvage, by E. Leach.--Groote Eylandt totemism and Le totémisme aujourd'hui, by P. Worsley.--Bibliography (p. 225-228).

A nontrivial ring with unit eliminates imaginaries just in case its complete theory has the following property: every definable m-ary equivalence relation E may be defined by a formula f = f, where f is an m-ary definable function. We show that for certain natural expansions of the field of p-adic numbers, elimination of imaginaries fails or is independent of ZPC. Similar results hold for certain fields of formal power series.

While environmental philosophers have been striving to extend ethics to deal with future generations and nonhuman life forms, very little work has been undertaken to address what is perhaps a more profound deficiency in received ethical doctrines, that they have very little impact on how people live. I explore Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on narratives and traditions and defend a radicalization of his arguments as a direction for making environmental ethics efficacious.

O presente artigo busca refletir sobre a fragmentação da Moral na contemporaneidade a partir da obra de Charles Taylor, denominada As Fontes do Self. A partir da obra After Virtue, procura também presentificar as ideias de Alasdair MacIntyre, autor que destaca a situação atual da moralidade. Para Taylor, a sociedade contemporânea sofre de um agudo mal-estar que tem suas raízes no individualismo, manifestando-se numa perda de sentido da vida e na fragmentação da moral. Para MacIntyre, a moral, desde (...) a modernidade, está em profunda desordem, pois possuem-se apenas fragmentos de um esquema conceitual que, juntos, não formam mais um todo coerente. Mediante as diferentes visões dos dois filósofos, o estudo pretende localizar as bases comuns em seus argumentos bem como certos distanciamentos em se tratando da estreita ligação entre Self e Moral. Suas pesquisas estão fundamentadas em autores clássicos, como Platão e Aristóteles, cujas influências ultrapassaram o horizonte histórico de suas épocas e se fazem perceber na contemporaneidade. Palavras-chave : Self. Ética das virtudes. Moralidade. Dependência. Contemporaneidade. (shrink)

Julius Kovesi was a moral philosopher contemporary with Alasdair MacIntyre, and dealing with many of the same questions as MacIntyre. In our view, Kovesi’s moral philosophy is rich in ideas and worth revisiting. MacIntyre agrees: Kovesi’s Moral Notions, he has said, is ‘a minor classic in moral philosophy that has not yet received its due’. Kovesi was not a thinker whose work fits readily into any one tradition. Unlike the later MacIntyre, he was not a Thomistic (...) Aristotelian, nor even an Aristotelian. He saw his viewpoint as Platonic, or perhaps more accurately as Socratic. His writings, unlike MacIntyre’s, have little to say about justice. However, Kovesi did offfer a theory of practical reason. His main contention was that all human social life embodies a set of concepts that govern and guide that life, concepts without which that life would be impossible. These include our moral concepts. For Kovesi, moral concepts are not external to, but constitutive of social life in any of its possible forms. But in the course of his argument he also developed a way of thinking about how concepts work, which we term ‘conceptual functionalism’, and which we will elucidate. (shrink)

In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment project of providing grounds for morality has been a failure, and believes that as a result, we are left with one of the two options: either a revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics or an endorsement of Nietzschean emotivism, i.e. a version of moral relativism. I shall first challenge MacIntyre’s emotivist portrait of Nietzsche and suggest an alternative reading of Nietzsche. If my diagnosis is correct, then we also need to (...) reinterpret the relation between MacIntyre and Nietzsche. This article aims to identify the difference in their characterization of the problem of morality, evaluate their proposal for a possible dissolution of the problem, and compare their method of moral enquiry. (shrink)

O presente texto tem o objetivo de apresentar a caracterização e crítica de Alasdair MacIntyre ao emotivismo moral, como também as posteriores controvérsias entre Waller-Unwin e John Lemos. Busca-se apresentar a leitura de MacIntyre sobre o emotivismo moral presente no último capítulo de A Short History of Ethics, suas críticas a essa concepção ética nos capítulos dois e três de After Virtue, os argumentos de Bruce Waller e Nicholas Unwin em defesa de uma reformulação do emotivismo moral e (...) as críticas de John Lemos a essa sugestão. Espera-se que o texto contribua na apresentação dos principais argumentos do debate entre MacIntyre e o emotivismo moral, a fim de servir de orientação para outras discussões na área da metaética. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta como os conceitos de virtude e sujeito moral se encontram caracterizados na ética das virtudes de Alasdair MacIntyre. Alasdair MacIntyre propõe a ética das virtudes como forma de devolver a inteligibilidade à pratica e teoria moral contemporânea, por meio da reapropriação de conceitos como virtude, tradição, telos e comunidade. Apresentamos, especificamente, como o autor elabora o conceito geral de virtude e como apresenta o sujeito moral tendo em vista a ética das virtudes.

Este ensaio oferece uma leitura fenomenológica do livro Depois da Virtude de Alasdair MacIntyre. Prentendemos simultaneamente ilustrar as similaridades entre o modo de argumentação de MacIntyre nesta obra e o método inicial de Heidegger da destruição fenomenológica, bem como sublinhar o potencial frutífero de um engajamento mais profundo entre fenomenologia e a obra de MacIntyre. A crítica de MacIntyre à filosofia moral moderna, assim como a destruição de Heidegger, se voltaram para a falta de fundamentação de (...) conceitos abstratos separados do contexto social e experiencial nos quais foram originalmente formulados. Apoiar-se na fenomenologia de Heidegger nos permite compreender melhor a crítica de MacIntyre, bem como o papel de sua noção de uma prática como um corretivo a essas tendências.: This essay offers a phenomenological reading of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. It is intended to both illustrate the similarities between MacIntyre’s mode of argumentation in this work and the early Heidegger’s method of phenomenological destruction, and to highlight the potential fruitfulness of a deeper engagement between phenomenology and MacIntyre’s work. MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral philosophy, like Heidegger’s destruction, turned upon the groundlessness of abstract concepts separated from the experiential and social context in which they were originally at home. Drawing upon Heidegger’s phenomenology allows one to better understand MacIntyre’s critique as well as the role of his notion of a practice as a corrective to these tendencies. Keywords : MacIntyre, Phenomenology, Heidegger. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 2, Page 453-473, April 2022.

Neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, proposes, in Dependent Rational Animals (1999), a naturalistic virtue ethics, anchored in the animal identity of human beings, together with the vulnerability and dependence to which we are subjected, as biologically constituted animals. He recognizes that, by using the term “good” as a direct reference to the flourishing of members of some animal or plant species as members of those species, he is offering a naturalistic interpretation of the good, but he does not make clear (...) what kind of naturalism he is committed to, not providing further explanations about what is understood by natural good and not presenting details about how to resolve this issue of the relationship between the good and its natural properties. So, we must ask what kind of naturalism does MacIntyre endorse. Does his naturalism meet the minimum requirements of an updated neo-Aristotelian naturalist proposal? These are some of the questions that we will analyze throughout this text. (shrink)

This paper is an examination of certain assumptions that, I hold, lie in the background of MacIntyre’s conception of the formation of the intellectual schema as found, most prominently, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. A thorough examination of MacIntyre’s concept of the rational schema, I will show, reveals that the parsing he proposes to carry out on intellectual history is confronted with a problem that finds its analogue in the field of (...) biological taxonomy. In order to carry out this project of determining where the seams lie in intellectual history one must first recognize that the parsing itself is a scheme-dependent undertaking. As such it is not unlike the necessarily somewhat arbitrary identification of species and genera in the biological realm. In other words, it should be recognized that intellectual history, like the morphology of the plant and animal kingdoms, is continuous, not discreet. An almost wholly unexamined assumption that stalks through Whose Justice? and Three Rival Versions is that there are something like intellectual natural kinds in the history of ideas. Indeed, the notion that there are “traditions” at all in the sense in which MacIntyre uses the term may be a highly conventional artefact of an Enlightenment-era view of intellectual progress. This leads me to conclude that MacIntyre has failed to observe that the view of traditions and schemes neatly succeeding one another, on which much of his critique is dependent, is itself a product of the perspective he calls “encyclopedia.” This, in turn, will make manifest why it is that almost all of MacIntyre’s examples of rational scheme-switching are from the natural sciences rather than the normative, a fact I will show is connected to a paradigm of linear progression that one tends to find in the exact sciences, but not in praxis. (shrink)

O artigo discute a relação entre verdade e moralidade na ética das virtudes de Alasdair MacIntyre, apontando para a tensão entre o realismo metafísico-teológico pressuposto em sua virada tomista a partir de Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, e a matriz, a nosso ver, claramente hermenêutico-pragmática de seu modelo da racionalidade das tradições morais de pesquisa racional, explicitado anteriormente em Depois da Virtude e em Justiça de Quem? Qual Racionalidade?.

Neste artigo lanço três tradições umas contra as outras para levantar algumas questões de pesquisa futura sobre a natureza da razão e a razão da natureza. Max Horkheimer e Theodor Adorno, da Escola de Frankfurt, sustentavam que a razão tende a dominar a natureza e que a dominação é parte da essência da razão. Dirijo-me, então, para examinar Aristóteles e aristotélicos contemporâneos, mais precisamente Mary Midgley e Alasdair MacIntyre, para mostar um recurso possível na tradição da filosofia ocidental na (...) qual a razão emerge da natureza. Usando modernos estudos de animais, Midgley e MacIntyre ampliam a visão aristotélica sobre a natureza da razão como parte de nossa natureza animal. Por fim, discuto os Lakotas, Primeina Nação dos povos da América do Norte, que tem uma visão da razão que é o espelho oposto daquela encontrada na modernidade. Essa comparação sugere que dominar a natureza não é essencial à razão. (shrink)

In MacIntyre’s view, the agent in order to have a consistent identity should be able to narrate a story about her life, which relates the different episodes of her life together. This story should explain the transition between these episodes. This story is based on the notion of the good of human beings. A notion of the good should be present in the agent’s life to give a direction to her life. This integrity forms an identity for the agent. (...) We intend to challenge this narrative view of identity in this paper. We will argue in this paper that though identity is formed in the eye of others, it does not need to be constituted in a unified narrative form, i.e., the agent does not need to place all episodes of her life in narrative order and have a consistent and unified account of her life, which includes her life from birth to death. Rather, shorter-term episodes of time suffice for identity formation. We will appeal to some findings of empirical psychology and neuroscience to support our claim. (shrink)

In MacIntyre’s view, the agent in order to have a consistent identity should be able to narrate a story about her life, which relates the different episodes of her life together. This story should explain the transition between these episodes. This story is based on the notion of the good of human beings. A notion of the good should be present in the agent’s life to give a direction to her life. This integrity forms an identity for the agent. (...) We intend to challenge this narrative view of identity in this paper. We will argue in this paper that though identity is formed in the eye of others, it does not need to be constituted in a unified narrative form, i.e., the agent does not need to place all episodes of her life in narrative order and have a consistent and unified account of her life, which includes her life from birth to death. Rather, shorter-term episodes of time suffice for identity formation. We will appeal to some findings of empirical psychology and neuroscience to support our claim. (shrink)

O pensamento filosófico de Alasdair MacIntyre tem influenciado um grande número de intelectuais das mais variadas áreas do conhecimento humano. Sociologia, economia, história, medicina e teologia, são alguns exemplos. Neste artigo, abordarei a questão narrativa no pensamento de MacIntyre e sua relevância para questões teológicas contemporâneas. Primeiro, perguntando pelas relações entre filosofia e teologia. Depois, aprofundando a questão da narrativa na teologia e no pensamento de MacIntyre. Finalmente, apontando caminhos, a partir do pensamento de MacIntyre, para (...) o pensar teológico face aos desafios contemporâneos. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre ao realizar uma série de críticas à moralidade e filosofia moral modernas e contemporâneas defende a tese de que o desacordo moral e a ausência de justificação racional para a moralidade é fruto do abandono do elemento teleológico da ética, especialmente do abandono da ética aristotélica, o que o leva a propor a retomada da ética teleológica de Aristóteles. Essa retomada é justificada com a teoria da racionalidade das tradições, por meio da afirmação de que o modo (...) tradicional de investigação é o melhor e que a tradição aristotélico-tomista corresponde a uma tradição moral superior às suas rivais. Com sua adesão a essa tradição MacIntyre vai apontar Tomás de Aquino como o teórico que conseguiu reunir todas as características do modo tradicional de investigação moral, integrando a tradição aristotélica e a agostiniana, o que fez com que o próprio MacIntyre se aproximasse e se apropriasse cada vez de elementos fundamentais do Tomismo. O Tomismo de MacIntyre, por sua vez, sofre uma série de críticas e objeções, especialmente em relação às tensões que se estabelecem no interior do pensamento do autor, que em After Virtue prometia um pensamento secular e pragmático. Este trabalho tratará dessa tensão e de algumas críticas direcionadas ao Tomismo de MacIntyre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC J. K. SWINDLER Westminster College Fulton, Missouri CONTRARY TO HIS own evident intentions and perceptions, in After Virtue A'lasdair Macinty!l.·e is much more of a Ptlatonist 1than the A1 ristotelian he aims to be. I hase this judgment both on the positive evidence that Macintyre and Plato (in the Republic) m1gue for and against the same crucial theses and on the negative evidence that Plato (...) has read answers to the very issues which Macintyre finds 1 intractable from an AristoteHan point of viiew. My thesis can be made out in terms of a half dozen issues which Maclntyire takes as crucial to his case: (1) Can there he a science of government? (2) Is there an answer to the sophist's chaillenge to morality? (3) How oan the fragmentation of the modern self he theoretically overcome? (4) What are the hi1stocical and social determinants of morality? (5) Is there a unity of virtue in addition to individual virtues? (6) Can we reconcile ourselves to teleofogy, the absence of the polis, and the tragedy of human 1:ife? I will consider each of these in turn. I. Wisdom Plato defines wisdom as knowledge of how to rule, and Aristotle (in the Nichomachean Ethics) distinguishes between theoretical and practical wisdom, 1suggesting thereby an interesting ambiguity in Plato's view, an ambiguity of which Macintyre makes a great deal. One may rule eithecr hy law or by judgment. In his attack on the Enlightenment, MacIntyre showis quite clearly tha;t the idea of a social science that would p11ovide laws of human behavior, which could in 343 344 J. K. SWINDLER turn be used by il"ulers and managers to predict and therefore manipulate!human action, was an invention of the eighteenth century. He offers an extensive 1oritique o.f this conception of socirul science, grounded primarily in the claim that human.behavior is essentially unlawful, at least if we judge it by the standards of the physical sciences. There is in human affairs a farge 1and uneliminwble element of fortiuna which makes it impossrible rto.formulate laws of human nature or behavior that would he exceptionless and therefore underwrite predictions of behavior. For there is nothing to be done about the unpredictability of innovations or, from one's own point of view, of one's own future actions; nor can the uncertainties of gametheoretie decisions and 1 the general contingency of the outcomes of ruction,be remedied. There is therefore no possibility of a social science in the sense in which Hume tried to imitate Newton. So much for Marx and Weber and the horde of modern.social scientists. This is not to say that life is completely uncertain; on the contrary, there are genuine and general regularities in society, some natural, some social, ·some statistical, some causal, wihich make life bearable. But these provide a,ground for the Aristotelian idea, endorsed by MacIntyre, that the principles of conduct, such as they might be, hold only for the most part and not universa1ly. There is therefore in Maclntyre's view no justification for 1a mora;l oode in the modern sense, nor ev;en of moral principles of the kind we are used to from Kant ·and Mill, Rawls and Nozick, which purport to istand as a sufficient criterion of right in all cases. But, importantly, we do not find any such rules or codes in Pla.to either. For Plato, too, insists on the mixed reign of chaos and logos in the materia;l world and in our Jives and concludes that judgment is essential to· determining right conduct. He tellrs us that wise rule comes only &om good oharructer and good institutions, that legislating in such detaii1 as to eliminate judgment is "cut:ting off the heads of a hy:dra." One cannot help hut think that tMs (essentially Hemclitean) point is something Aristotle ~earned at his MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC 345 master's knee. And both aspects of Plato's :point ~e ipresent in Aristotle, viz., that s~nce the:ve is chance in nature, there is luck (good 'and had) in life, and since no rule can capture the particularity of conorete situations right... (shrink)

Esta investigação, partindo do diagnóstico da modernidade empreendido por Alasdair MacIntyre, destina-se a avaliar a possibilidade de conciliação entre o discurso universalizante dos direitos humanos e a ética particularista sustentada pelo autor citado a partir do referencial ético aristotélico. A convergência entre os bens individuais, consubstanciados em direitos, e o bem comum, componente essencial da prática e do pensamento éticos, pode representar relevante contribuição teórica no campo de estudos dos direitos humanos. Neste trabalho, dada a limitação da sua natureza, (...) intentou-se analisar os três problemas intrínsecos à concepção de direitos, conforme a perspectiva de MacIntyre: a) a ideia de que sujeitos de direitos são indivíduos morais autônomos e plenamente independentes; b) a separação do bem individual do bem comum; c) a deflação da razão prática comunitária, em relação à racionalidade individual. O trabalho empreendido teve como resultado uma exposição analítica dos pontos de contraste entre a perspectiva dos direitos humanos e a ética conforme compreendida por MacIntyre, necessária para preparar bases de uma possível reconciliação entre ambas. (shrink)

O estudo visa evidenciar o lugar que os princípios primeiros ocupam na filosofia moral de Alasdair MacIntyre, bem como o conceito de teleologia a eles articulado. Consistirá, no estudo panorâmico das categorias centrais da ética das virtudes de MacIntyre, onde ele constrói sua teoria da racionalidade das tradições que, por sua vez, é essencial para sua compreensão da retomada da ética aristotélica das virtudes e o papel dos princípios primeiros na sua filosofia moral. A partir destes, o desenvolvimento (...) do artigo se dá com a identificação do lugar que os primeiros princípios ocupam na filosofia moral de MacIntyre, como também a relevância que eles têm para o desenvolvimento de sua teoria do resgate da ética aristotélica. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Alasdair MacIntyre em sua filosofia moral propõe uma ética das virtudes que tem como um de seus fundamentos a condição de animalidade e dependência do homem, assim como a noção de florescimento, que implica o desenvolvimento do raciocínio prático independente. Neste trabalho buscamos identificar como MacIntyre apresenta o caráter de animalidade e vulnerabilidade do ser humano enquanto animal racional e o processo de florescimento que (...) somente se realiza pelo exercício das virtudes do reconhecimento da dependência e do raciocínio independente. Palavras-chave : Dependência. Florescimento. Raciocínio prático. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de fornecer um rápido esboço do atual estado do debate em torno do conceito de justiça. Hoje não dispomos de um conceito único compartilhado do que significa justiça e isto devido ao fato das sociedades atuais serem pluralistas, tal fato gerou uma separação entre as esferas morais e políticas e consequentemente o termo justo tem hoje dois aspectos distintos, um moral e outro político.: Nowadays we do not have a shared unitary concept of means (...) justice, because our present societies are pluralistics. This fact generates a gap between moral and political spheres, and as a consequence the word “just” have today at least two distinct and large meanings: one moral and the other political. This paper aims to provide a quick sketch of the debate concerning those two meanings from the perspective of Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory. Keywords : Justice, Moral Community, Well-Being. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement (...) concerning the norms of rationality, despite its theoretical and practical importance, is one which is, or so I argue, irresolvable. Moreover, the series of disagreements which I examine in the context of the debate between Rorty and MacIntyre is not peculiar or idiosyncratic to them. Their dispute reflects presumptions common to contemporary analytical philosophy. And while analytical philosophers have not made discussions of human nature one of their characteristic concerns, I indicate that such concerns do play a central role in the controversy which I examine. Differences of opinion concerning the political and social nature of human beings are reflected up and down the philosophical line. My argument is in no way concerned with issues of psychological priority or causality (e.g. whether having certain views disposes one psychologically to accepting other views). What I establish are the logical relations, and the points of philosophical contention, among certain epistemo logical and political theses. In Part I, I rehearse Rorty's epistemological views and examine how these views are connected to his views on morality and human nature. In Part II, I begin with MacIntyre's position concerning the virtues and modern moral philosophy and then reconstruct, ex pede Herculem, his views on rationality. Part III examines the prospects of reconciling the perspectives discussed in the first two sections. (shrink)

Se aborda en particular su relectura de Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino, junto con su análisis de algunas discusiones relevantes en las ciencias sociales. Según MacIntyre, el abandono del aristotelismo y su esquema teleológico de la investigación filosófica y de la razón práctica ha generado confusión e incoherencia en las articulaciones conceptuales de la filosofía moral moderna y contemporánea. En opinión de este autor, en el concepto de tradición el presente es considerado una reapropiación del pasado, lo que brinda (...) coherencia a las argumentaciones. A los fines de este trabajo se opta por una aproximación a medio camino entre una metodología analítica y una historia conceptual basada en el reconocimiento de distintas discusiones de las cuales se nutren los conceptos macinteryanos. Finalmente, se valoran las contribuciones de MacIntyre a la vez que se indican algunas limitaciones de su tesis. (shrink)